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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
house Cases, 2 1 i. e. to the protection of those fundamental rights of citizens
22
Under the due process and equality clauses the
of all free governments.
same result could have been reached with little, if any, change in their meaning.
Furthermore, if the real reason for the prevention of discrimination were the
interstate character of the transactions, the protection would have been more
adequate by reverting to Chief Justice Marshall's definition of commerce,
23
The abandonment of a long established,
namely, traffic or transportation.
though emasculated, interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of
2 4
the 14th Amendment seemed unjustified and was criticized greatly.
The express overruling of Colgate v. Harvey in the principal case therefor,
would seem a valid result. The matter of federal court supervision of state
regulation has been in enough confusion under the due process and equality
clause without inviting increased litigation by giving the privileges and
immunities clause a broad undefined meaning. Since there is little if any
difference in lending money through promissory notes and lending money
through bank deposits the court should be commended for not finding some
spurious distinction between the principal case and Colgate 'U.Harvey and for
doing something which it rarely has done, openly overruling a former case.
Apparently the Supreme Court has sent the privileges and immunities clause
of the 14th Amendment back into the obscurity from whence it was unW.E.B.
necessarily summoned in 1936.

RIGnTs.-Plaintiff held a patent on a
PATENTs-REISSUES-INTERVENING
machine suitable for displaying roasted nuts, keeping them hot, and from
which they could be vended. Defendant acquired similar machines from
a manufacturer and without knowledge of plaintiff's patent used them. Six
months thereafter the defendant learned of plaintiff's patent. The defendant's
machines did not infringe plaintiff's patent and he continued to use them.
Three months after defendant learned of plaintiff's patent, and within two
years of the issue of it plaintiff applied for and secured a reissue patent which
was broad enough to cover the machines used by defendant. Plaintiff then
sued defendant for infringing the reissue patent. Defendant claimed its use
of the machines before reissue without infringing the original patent created
intervening rights sufficient to amount to an absolute defense. Held, reissue
patent valid and infringed; defendant may not bar the action as he has no
intervening rights. National Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores (C. C. A. 9th,
1939), 107 F. (2d) 318.
21 Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), 16 Wall. 36 (minority opinion).
22 For a discussion of what are considered "fundamental rights" see Corfield v. Coryell (1S25), 4 Was. C. C. 37, a case relating to the privileges and
immunities clause under Sec. II, Art. IV of the Constitution.
23 Willis, Gibbons v. Ogdon, Then and Now (1940), 23 Ky. L. J. 280.
Note that a former interpretation of the Commerce Clause discussed in this
article on page 383 might have been used to effect the same result as that
reached in Colgate v. Harvey under the privileges and immunities clause.
24 30 Ill. L. J. 953; 84 U. of Pa. L. R. 655; 45 Yale L. J. 926; 13 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 496; 49 Har. L. R. 935; 3 U. of Chi. L. R. 506; 36 Col. L. R. 669;
20 Minn. L. R. 549; 11 Ind. L. J. 390; 2 U. of Pitts. L. R. 202; 1 Mo. L. R.
187; 11 Wis. L. R. 434; 14 N. C. L. R. 232; 5 Fordham L. R. 352; 34, Mich.
L. R. 1034; 14 Tex. L. R. 548.
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A patent is a statutory grant of a monopoly to the patentee insuring to him
the exclusive use for a period of seventeen years of that part of his invention
1
That which the inventor fails to claim he dedicates
he claims as his own.
2
However the patentee has a statutory right to correct a
to the public.
patent which is invalid or inoperative because of an error arising from an
3
A reissue is void if not
inadvertent mistake by securing a reissue patent.
4
The courts have read into
for the same invention as the original patent.
1 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (1907), 210 U. S.
405, 28 S. Ct. 748,-52 L. Ed. 11221 R. S. §4834 as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. 40.
2 Miller v. Brass Co. (1881), 104 U. S. 350, 36 L. Ed. 783; Mahn v. Harwood (1884), 112 U. S. 354, 5 S. Ct. 174, 2S L. Ed. 665; Parker & Whipple
Co. v. Yale Clock Co. (1887), 123 U. S. 87, 8 S. Ct. 38, 31 L. Ed. 100; In re
Otto (1919), 259 F. 985.
3 R. S. § 4916 as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. § 64 which reads in part:
"Reissue of defective patents: patents for separate parts. Whenever any
patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
or insufficient specification, or by reason of the patentee claiming as his own
invention or discovery more than he had a right to claim as new, if the
error has arisen by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any
fraudulent or deceptive intention, the commissioner shall, on the surrender of
such patent and the payment of the duty required by law, cause a patent for
the same invention, and in accordance with the corrected specification, to be
reissued to the patentee or to his assigns or legal representatives, for the
unexpired part of the term of the original patent. * * * Every patent
so reissued, together with the corrected specifications, shall have the same
effect and operation in law, on the trial of all actions for causes thereafter
arising, as if the same had been originally filed in such corrected form;
but no new matter shall be introduced into the specifications, nor in the case
of a machine patent shall the model or drawings be amended, except each
by the other;

*

*

*" Hobbs v. Beach

(1900),

180 U. S.

383,

21 S.

Ct,

409, 45 L. Ed. 586; Miller v. Brass Co. (1881), 10+ U. S. 350, 36 L. Ed. 783;
Topliff v. Topliff (1891), 145 U. S. 156, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658. As to
the purpose and intent of the reissue statute: "The great object seems to
have been to enable the patentee to make a description more clear, plain, and
specific."
Miller v. Brass Co. (1881), 104- U. S. 350, 36 L. Ed. 783;
"4* * * the purpose of the statute was to provide that kind of relief which
courts of equity have always given in cases of clear accident and mistake
in the drawing of written instruments." Mahn v. Harwood (1884), 112 U. S.
354, 5 S. Ct. 174, 28 L. Ed. 665; "* * * the dominant purpose of the
reissue statute was to save to the inventor the future remaining after the
reissue." Baldwin v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (1915), 227 F. 455; "The
plain purpose of this section is to give to the patentee an opportunity to
make valid and operative that which had been invalid and inoperative;
invalid because it claimed as new that which had been previously invented
or used by the public; inoperative, because the specification was defective or
insufficient." McCormick Harv. Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co. (1897), 169 U. S.
606, 18 S. Ct. 443, 42 L. Ed. 875.
4 Gill v. Wells (1874), 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 1, 22 L. Ed. 699; Russell v.
Dodge (1876), 93 U. S. 460, 23 I.. Ed. 973; Brainard v. Cramme (1882), 12
F. 621; Coon v. Wilson (1884), 113 U. S. 268, 5 S. Ct. 537, 28 L. Ed. 963;
Newton v. Furst & Bradley Mfg. Co. (1886), 119 U. S. 373, 7 S. Ct. 369, 30
L. Ed. 442; Hubel v. Dick (1886), 28 F. 132; Dunham v. Dennison Co. (1894),
154 U. S. 103, 14 S. Ct. 986, 38 L. Ed. 924; Amer. Soda Fount. Co. v. Swietuseh
(1896), 85 F. 968. Definition of "same invention," Topliff v. Topliff (1891),
145 U. S. 156, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658; If the enlarged claims might of themselves be the subject of a new patent then new matter has been introduced
and the reissue is void. Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co. (1887),
123 U. S. 87, 8 S. Ct. 38, 31 L. Ed. 100.
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the statute that the patentee must apply for the reissue within a reasonable
time.G
Where the patent is invalid or inoperative because it claims too much
6
As to such limited
it may be corrected by a reissue limiting its claims.
reissues application any time within the life of the original patent is reason7
able, so long as it is made with reasonable diligence after discovery of defect.
Where the patent, due to an error arising from an inadvertent mistake,
fails to secure to the patentee all that he has invented or claimed it must
be broadened to protect him.S Application for a broadened reissue must be
within two years of the granting of the original patent to be reasonable.9 This
is based upon analogy to the statute affecting public use before application
for a patent which operates as a bar. This statute as amended to be effective
August 5, 1940, changes the time of use which will operate as a bar from
two to one year.10 It is to be expected that consistent with the analogy the
presumptive period in reissue applications will also be cut to one year. Whether
the courts will do this remains to be seen. In the absence of a showing of
special circumstances excusing a longer delay the reissue will be held void
5 Wilson v. Rousseau (1846), 4 How. (U. S.) 646, 11 L. Ed. 1140; R. S.
34916 as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. § 64 makes no mention of time limit.
6 Under the disclaimer statute R. S. § 4917, 35 U. S. C. A. § 65, it is easier
to disclaim the part of a claim that is excessive than it is to secure a reissue.
7 Hawie Mfg. Co. v. Hatheway Mfg. Co. (1928), 27 F. (2d) 937; Budd
Vheel Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 16 F. Supp. 115.
8 A claim is broadened if it serves to bring within the monopoly an
intervening structure which otherwise would be free. Supreme Mfg. Corp.
v. Security Mfg. Co. (1924), 299 F. 65, 68. Lewis M. Hosea inReissued Patents
-The Dictum of Justice Bradley Examined (1882), 16 Am. L. R. 296, contends
that Congress had in mind permitting broadened reissues pointing out that
the reissue statute of 1836 used the terms "specification" and "claim" interchangeably and that the original statute was passed after the case of Grant
v. Raymond (1832), 6 Pet. 218, 8 L. Ed. 376, showed its need, this case being
based upon a patent reissued for the express purpose of enlarging the claim.
Later acts are not presumed to have used the term "specification" in a
different sense than the original act. Amer. Automotoneer Co. v. Porter
(1916), 232 F. 456. The courts permit broadened reissues as being within
the equity of the statute. Mahn v. Harwood (1884), 112 U. S. 354, 5 S. Ct.
174, 28 L. Ed. 665; Miller v. Brass Co. (1881), 104 U. S. 350, 36 L. Ed. 783;
Topliff v. Topliff (1891), 145 U. S. 156, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658; Keller v.
Adams-Campbell Co. (1923), 264 U. S. 314, 44 S. Ct. 356, 68 L. Ed. 705;
D. Walter Brown in Of Reissue Patents 'with Broadened Claims (1890), 24
Am. L. R. 973, makes a distinction between statutory reissues limiting claims
and equitable reissues broadening claims. He contends that a broadened
reissue is actually "for a different invention" but may be taken out of the
application of the statute by the doctrine of Miller v. Brass Co.
9 C. & N. W. R. R. v. Sayles (1878), 97 U. S. 554, 24 L. Ed. 1053; Miller
v. Brass Co. (1881), 104 U. S. 350, 36 L. Ed. 783; Mahn v. Harwood (1884),
112 U. S. 354, 5 S. Ct. 174, 28 L. Ed. 665; Wollensak v. Reiher (1884), 115
U. S. 96, 5 S. Ct. 1137, 29 L. Ed. 350; Brown v. Davis (1886), 116 U. S. 237,
6 S. Ct. 379, 29 L. Ed. 659; White v. Dunbar (1886), 119 U. S. 47, 7 S. Ct.
72, 30 L. Ed. 303, where it is said that in such cases intervening rights do not
add to the illegality of the reissue; Topliff v. Topliff (1891), 145 U. S. 156,
12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658. It should be noted that it is the application for
the reissue, not the granting of it that must be within the two year limit. The
cases are clear on this point.
10 R. S. § 4886 as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. § 31; Root v. Third Ave. R. Co.,
146 U. S. 210. 13 S. Ct. 100, 36 L. Ed. 946.
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for laches.11 Under some circumstances a delay of less than the presumptive
12
period may be unreasonable so as to void the reissue.
A patentee has therefor, not only a monopoly on the exclusive use of that
part of his invention he claims, but also the power to secure a monopoly on
that part which he inadvertently failed to claim provided he corrects this
mistake within a reasonable time by obtaining a reissue.
The principal case presents the question: Has the defendant through use
acquired sufficient intervening rights to bar an action for infringement?
The doctrine of private intervening rights originated in a dictum of the
3
U. S. Supreme Court,1 but the court has made no decision directly on the
point.14 The law of private intervening rights, being chiefly dicta, arising
in cases where it is immaterial because the reissue is void either because of
unreasonable delay in making application or failure to come within the statutory requirements, is in a state of confusion. It is clear that the doctrine is
inapplicable where the reissue limits the claim of the original patent since
any infringement of the reissue would be a fortiori infringe the original.',
Defendant cannot invoke intervening rights unless his device is an independent
invention, not a copy of plaintiff's, for such conduct lacks good faith.10 Plaintiff has no right to an accounting for the period between the original grant
17
and the reissue.
Change of position upon the faith of a misrepresentation is a defense.IS
Therefore in suits for infringement of reissue patents it would seem necessary
that the defendant entered the field and changed his position prejudicially in
9
A basis for allowing
reliance upon the omissions of the original patent.1
an individual such a bar may be found in the reason behind the two year
rule of laches. A broadened reissue granted after the presumptive period is
11Laches in this sense is sometimes referred to as "intervening public
rights." This is to be distinguished from the term "private intervening rights"
used herein which indicates a bar available to an individual only.
12 H. W. Roos Co. v. McMillan (1934), 64. F. (2d) 568.
13Topliff v. Topliff (1891), 145 U. S. 156, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658.
14 Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co. (1923), 264 U. S. 314-, 44 S. Ct. 356, 68
L. Ed. 705, where the court says, "The views of the Circuit Courts of Appeal
on the general subject of the scope of intervening rights are not entirely easy
to reconcile."
15Baldwin v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (1917), 245 U. S. 198, 38 S. Ct.
104, 63 L. Ed. 240; Hawie Mfg. Co. v. Hatheway Mfg. Co. (1928), 27 F. (2d)
937.
16 Bucher & Gibbs Plow Co. v. Int. Harv. Co. (1913), 211 F. 473; Albertson
& Co. v. Beckley Ralston Co. (1919), 258 F. 453.
17Baldwin v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (1915), 227 F. 455, (1917), 245
U. S. 198, 38 S. Ct. 104, 62 L. Ed. 240.
18 "By misrepresentation is meant a false impression of some fact, or set
of facts, created upon the mind of one person by another, by language, or by
language and conduct together, or by conduct alone equivalent to language,
where there appears to be no intention to warrant the same." BIGELOW ON
ESTOPPEL (5th Ed. 1890), 556; "* * * it is sufficient even if the representation is made to the public generally with a view to its being acted on, and
the plaintiff as one of the public acts on it and suffers damages thereby."
Swift v. Winterbotham (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 253, 42 L. J. Q. B. 111; Richardson
v. Silvester (1873), L. R. 9 Q. B. 36, 43 L. 3. Q. B. 1.
19 In this respect the decision in the principal case is in accord since the
defendant admitted he had not relied upon the omissions in the plaintiff's
original patent.
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held void on the presumption that the general public has relied upon the
omissions in the original patent, adopted the invention and developed the art.
Any member of the public may then bar an infringement suit on the reissue.
No actual harm need be proved, but reliance and change of position are
presumed after the time limit. Where a defendant can show he actually
relied upon the omissions, adopted the invention and developed the art he
should then be allowed to bar a suit on the reissue. He has proved the harm
20
which after the presumptive would be presumed.
Private intervening rights, if so limited and applied, would have the
following results. Utmost care would be required of an inventor in making
his original claim. His right to a reissue would not be impaired. By repeating
his original claim in the reissue he could maintain the monopoly he received
under the original patent. He would risk losing only that part of his invention
he inadvertently failed to claim. He could extend his patent to cover his
entire invention and this would be good against all except those acquiring
intervening rights before the reissue was applied for. It does not seem unreasonable to hold an inventor to his losses resulting from his own mistake
where he is given the power to prevent further losses by correcting the mistake.
The government grants a monopoly only on that part of the invention the
patentee claims and should not make a broadened claim retroactive against
21
one who has changed his position in reliance on the first monopoly.
R. B. W.

PICKETING 13Y "OuTSmE" UNION-INDIANA ANTI-INJUNCrioN Acr.-Plaintiff,
operator of a small retail grocery in the city of Hammond, employed three
persons, all of whom were satisfied with their working conditions and the
relations with their employer. These employees had previously joined defendant union under threat by the latter to picket their place of employment
and thus cause them to lose their jobs, but had resigned on being ordered to
strike, and were not now, nor were desirous of again becoming, members.
Defendant began to peacefully picket plaintiff's store to compel plaintiff to
sign a closed shop contract. On application for injunction, held, injunction
granted, the picketing is unlawful. For a labor union to demand that an
employer require union membership of his employees is contrary to the policy
of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act.' Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail
Clerks Union (Ind. 1939), 24 N. E. (2d) 280.

20 Only a few decisions are based upon personal intervening rights alone.
Each was a suit on a broadened reissue secured within a reasonable time
where defendant changed his position in good faith and reliance on the
original patent. See: Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories (1928),
27 F. (2d) 744- (defendant allowed to continue to use the particular machines) ;
Bull Dog Floor Clip Co. v. Munson (1927), 19 F. (2d) 43 (defendant manufacturer allowed to sell articles on hand after reissue); Autopiano Co. v.
Amer. Player Action Co. (1915), 222 F. 276; Ashley v. Tatum Co. (1917),
240 F. 979 (defendant allowed intervening rights amounting to a permanent
license to manufacture and sell).
21 See Note (1931), 44 Harv. L. R. 959; Article (1934), 43 Yale L. R. 766;
Article (1935), 8 S. Cal. L. R. 288.
1 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, §§40-501 to 40-514.

